Normal financial-services firms should have been dealing in the safe, middle-of-the road mortgages that Fannie and Freddie specialise in. Except that they were crowded out into subprime mortgages. Fannie and Freddie should never have grown so large. Except that they wanted to exploit the margin between the government-guaranteed borrowing costs and the commercial lending income. They should have been stopped by Congress and their regulator. Except that they spent some of their subsidy on a fierce lobbying machine.
　　正常的金融服务商本该经营二房擅长的不冒风险、中规中矩的抵押业务——可惜它们被挤入了次贷市场；房利美和房地美原本不会成长到今天的规模–可惜它们想赚取政府担保的贷款成本和商业贷款收入之间的差额；二房本该受制于国会和监理机构——可惜它们将部分补贴用于雇佣强劲有力的游说机器。

　　Fannie must not
　　“房”不可倒

　　In the past, we have argued for privatising Fannie and Freddie completely. But now that the guarantee is explicit, Mr Paulson should seek to secure the gains for taxpayers and treat Fannie and Freddie like one of their own mortgages, by nationalising them, breaking them up and selling them on. That would almost double the public debt-but only in book-keeping terms. The liability is already implicit (as at Northern Rock), and, unlike Treasuries, it is ultimately backed by housing as collateral.
　　过去，我们支持对二房实行彻底的私有化，但眼下，既然政府的担保已经明确无误，保尔森就该为纳税人考虑，谋求保护其财富，并将二房当作自身抵押的资产之一，进行国有化，拆分，继而出售。这么做几乎要让国债翻一番–不过只会出现在簿记账面上。二房的债务已转入后台操作（如同北岩银行），而且最终有房市的间接支撑，这一点不同于国库券。

　　It is harder to know what to do about all those other implicit state guarantees-seemingly to any financial outfit. The first instinct should be to make sure someone suffers; shareholders and managers at the very least. It was a valuable lesson when some of IndyMac’s depositors could not get hold of their money because they exceeded the government guarantee.
　　想知道其它那些拥有国家暗中担保的机构何去何从，这更不容易——对于任何金融机构似乎都是这样。依据本能，第一步应该是确保有人承受苦痛，而股东和管理层至少该承担责任。印地麦克的一些存款人由于未受政府担保而无法保住钱财，这是个宝贵的教训。

　　If you cannot let firms fail in a bust, then you must contain them in the boom. That helps explain why the investment banks now need more supervision; why financial firms should have to hold more capital as a boom gathers pace; and why monetary policy should lean against rising asset prices. Regulation is necessary, but beware the state being seduced into taking on duties it cannot possibly carry out well. As Fannie and Freddie show, regulators are easily captured and outwitted. The best controls are transparency and competition. When possible the government needs to stand back. Sadly, it failed to do so in the American mortgage market.
　　如果不能让企业完全破产，就应保证它们业务兴旺。这有助于解释投行在眼下为什么需要更多的监管；金融机构为什么得在繁荣行将消失时握有更多的资本；以及货币政策为什么应向上涨的资产价格倾斜。监管是必需的，但得谨防政府被误入歧途，承担起可能无法良好履行的职责。二房危机表明，监理机构的政策容易落后于、受困于时局。最好的管制手段是透明度和相互竞争，政府应在可能的时候退居二线。遗憾的是，在美国的房贷抵押市场中，政府没能这么做。

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